group members, and many other jobs up to very senior jobs of chairman, lady vice-chairman and male vice-chairman of the patients' committeethe 'top three' as they are calledwho are responsible for co-ordinating the work of the whole patients' committee and who deal with all manner of problems by day and night in association with staff members.
The anxieties encountered in the performance of these roles and the relationship problems involved are under constant scrutiny. There is a continuous examination and re-appraisal of action and function.
The community, then, is a highly structured one with clear role differentiation, so that people understand what is expected from them, and there are predictable consequences to particular kinds of behaviour. At the same time the roles are flexible, so that they can be changed in response to new needs.
Predictable controls which necessarily come into play when there is disturbance, for example violence, mean that many patients have the experience of being held and contained through phases of disturbance and crises. At the same time patients can demonstrate or dramatize their problems behaviourally without fear that the effects will be too disastrous. The public examination of all events and issues and the continuous self-reflective operations of the community reduce the danger of bureaucratic stereotype attitudes being maintained.
The vital aspect of the therapeutic community is the enormous amount of potentially relevant data which is always available.
Appropriate staff-patient or patient groups deal with breaches of the rules and deviant behaviour. In addition, special meetings are convened at any time of the day or night to deal with crises; for example, where there is violence to property or person such a meeting is necessarily called. These meetings are extremely useful as issues are treated when urgent and alive. There is an assertion of control and regulation, but in the context of concern for the participants.
By having a structure which allows a considerable degree of control and which counteracts forces of disruption, and which at the same time allows considerable understanding of the forces at work, whether in an individual, in a particular group, or from faulty staff performance, crises can be used constructively and can be important learning experiences for the participants. Horton was taken over by the Emergency Medical Service in 1939 but, when reopened as a mental hospital in 1948, lost no time in pursuing this same policy. On the male side two locked wards have remained, but they offer no more than token security, for if their patients are to be treated rather than incarcerated they must be moved around in the hospital for social, recreational or occupational purposes; those determined to abscond thus have ample opportunity.
The revolutionary change in the conduct of mental hospitals was given legal blessing in the Mental Health Act, 1959. But there were, I believe, drawbacks in those parts of the Act concerned with the care and treatment of the mentally abnormal offender.
At Horton the impact of the offender has been more and more felt since the implementation of the new Act in November 1960 (Rollin 1963 (Rollin , 1965 . The upsurge in the number of mentally abnormal offenders admitted to mental hospitals is not exclusively a metropolitan phenomenon. This is apparent from the annual reports of the Prison Commissioners which, between 1961 and 1963, show a 25 % rise in cases remanded to prison for medical (almost always psychiatric) report and in hospital orders subsequently made. That Horton's experience is not a local one is shown in a recent paper by Bearcroft & Donovan (1965) of Long Grove Hospital, Epsom, which admits almost as many male offenders.
With the decrease in security at Horton the number of 'abscondences', as they were now euphemistically called, increased, but they did not assume startling proportions until after 1961 when the population of offenders began to build up. Table 1 shows the number of abscondences notified to the police for the years 1961, 1962 and 1963, compared with those of non-offenders admitted under compulsory orders in the same year. It can be seen that whereas the number of abscondences in the non-offender group has remained reasonably steady the number in the offender group has gone up greatly. Such a dramatic increase indicated serious flaws in the working of the new Act which demanded investigation. So as to allow a two-year follow-up I have confined my attention to the abscondences of male offenders admitted in the years 1961 and 1962. There were thus 66 offender-patients who had absconded on at least one occasion. In 11 cases there were two separate admissions during the same two years of the same individual, so that the number of admissions as opposed to individuals totalled 77. Of these 59 (77%) were admissions under Part V and included 49 under Section 60, 5 under Section 65, i.e. with restrictions on discharge, and 5 under Section 72, i.e. directly from prison. Eighteen (23 %) were initially admissions under Part IV, with the exception of one admission under Section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948. Particularly noteworthy are the 10 who absconded out of a total of 17 admitted with restriction or discharge (Sections 65 and 72).
The 66 individual absconders between them totalled 188 abscondences up to the end of 1964, an average of 3 each, but the actual distribution is shown in Table 2 .
A few absconders returned voluntarily after varying periods of time and a few were returned by the police and at their expense. In the vast majority of cases, however, two nurses had to be sent to escort the absconder back to hospital. This entailed journeys, mainly by car, to various Metropolitan police stations, but more venturesome absconders had to be collected from widely scattered points. The length of time the absconders remained at liberty varied widely and if it exceeded the statutory limit of, for example, twenty-eight days under Section 60, they were then considered to have been 'discharged by operation of the law' (D.O.L.). Thirty offenders (45%) were so discharged,or having been re-arrested and convicted during their abscondence they received prison sentences, or arrangements were made for their admission to Broadmoor.
It is important to note that the same individual can be admitted repeatedly under different hospital orders to the same hospital and repeatedly abscond and be discharged D.O.L. Thus the same offender was admitted four times to Horton under Section 60 between January 1961 If by the criterion of escapes or abscondences Horton was in 1938 considered an efficient hospital, are the soaring numbers of abscondences since the implementation of the Mental Health Act a glaring indictment of custodial inefficiency? Before arriving at a verdict it would be well to examine the evidence in terms of the material which is entrusted to the hospital's care in all good faith by the police and the judiciary. I propose to scrutinize first the psychiatric and then the criminal histories of the group of 66 male absconders. Table 3 shows the age distribution of the 66 absconders under consideration. It can be seen that the 20s and 30s are markedly overrepresented and a strikingly high proportion (51 %) are in their 30s.
Equally striking is the overwhelming number of schizophrenics: 62 out of 66 (94 %). In 49 of the 66 absconders (74%) there was a documented history of previous mental hospital admissions. Tables 4 and 5 analyse these data in terms of the number of previous admissions to a total of 52 mental hospitals and observation wards excluding Horton, and the length of time spent in them. These two tables show that 39 of the 49 offenders had had multiple admissions and 29 had spent between six months and ten years in mental hospitals. Briefly, then, the psychiatric problem in the majority of these offenders with documented psychiatric histories is one of chronic schizophrenia in the comparatively young.
With the helpful co-operation of the Home Office Research Unit and the Criminal Records Office the previous criminological records of some of the absconders were made available. They revealed that no less than 41 (62%) had criminal records, but the number of actual offences committed ranged from one in 4 cases to between eleven and twenty in 10 cases. Thirty-five had served prison sentences ranging from one sentence in 7 cases to 3 who had served over eleven sentences. In Table 7 the psychiatric and criminological records are combined to give an even more comprehensive picture of the histories of the 66 reluctant patients prior to their key admission to Horton. It is my submission that at least the 33 with both previous mental hospital admissions and previous offences, shown in column (3), who have been demonstrated as being for the most part incurable in psychiatric terms and incorrigible in legal terms, were unsuitable for admission to a conventional mental hospital, either Horton or any hospital without bars, and furthermore that this might have been predicted.
My submission is amply supported by the facts revealed in the follow-up. This was from January 1, 1961 1, , until December 31, 1964 , that is for a minimum of two years and a maximum of four years.
Of the original 1961-2 cohort, 2 absconded and committed suicide, and 1 was eventually repatriated to Canada. The number at risk, therefore, was 63. Only 6 remained continuously on the books of the hospital throughout the whole period, but as this did not prevent them from committing offences during periods of abscondence, they are included. In the 11 cases of discharge and readmission in the two-year period after re-arrest the first admission is counted as the key admission.
Within these terms of reference it was found that 30 (45%) were discharged by 'operation of the law' or by rearrest and reconviction. It is interesting that those discharged in this unorthodox way had a far worse record of subsequent offences than those discharged through orthodox channels. Thus of the D.O.L. group of 30, 24 committed further offences, averaging two The overall number found guilty of offences following their first discharge was 43 (68% of those at risk), who between them committed 88 offences. The disposal of these offences by the judiciary was varied: readmission to mental hospitals under Part V or Part IV in 37 cases; prison sentences in 28 cases; and 23 cases were dealt with by fines, probation orders or discharges.
Attempts to trace subsequent admissions to mental hospitals not via the police proved most difficult. However, incomplete as the data must be, it was found that 13 at least had been readmitted to Horton and other hospitals with, between them, a total of 21 readmissions. The acknowledged difference in quality between the excellent criminological data and the dubious psychiatric data makes sophisticated statistical analysis of them in combination doubtfully valid. However, it is valid and most significant to compare previous with subsequent offences and offences plus mental hospital admissions (the psychiatric element in these data can be, in fact, discounted for the purposes of this comparison). In the former the figures total 42 (64%) which compares remarkably closely with 43 (65%) in the latter. The inevitable conclusion is that the pattern of behaviour which determined the offenders' key admission to Horton has been perpetuated and has not been altered at all by their treatment in hospital, their abscondences, their subsequent rearrest, appearance in court, reconviction and, not infrequently, periods of imprisonment. They go on committing offences. I have no doubt that to the charge of custodial inefficiency entered against Horton, a verdict of 'guilty' will be returned. This I expected; but as a plea in mitigation I submit that the task from the beginning was impossible. This could have been predicted if those who had the responsibility of committing offenders to us had consulted all the documents, crimninological and psychiatric, which could have been made available to them.
To attempt to resolve this paradoxical situation wherein mental hospitals without bars are expected to provide little less than prison-like security is not included in my brief. Security hospitalsnot security units within conventional hospitalswill have to be designated or purposebuilt. Until this is done the present Gilbertian situation will continue, and psychiatrists and jurists, instead of being, as the new Act envisaged, brothers-in-law, will become increasingly partners-in-crime.
